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In this paper we study Brain Drain (BD) and Fiscal Competition
(FC) in a uniﬁed framework for the European Union (EU) speciﬁc
context. Potential mobility of educated workers can increase the
degree of FC through taxation or the provision of public education.
An increase in FC can be caused by competition among diﬀerent
jurisdictions that aim to attract educated workers. When the im-
portance of FC increases, then the European States may employ FC
as a new policy tool. We propose a simple model in which is possi-
ble describe diﬀerent scenarios: Brain Gain (when BD may increase
average productivity in the source economy); Brain Drain (when
there is unidirectional ﬂow of highly skilled workers that is welfare-
deteriorating in the source economy); Migration Competition (when
the regions have not high diﬀerences in the productivity and they
compete attracting educated workers); Fiscal Competition (when ju-
risdictions compete either to attract a mobile tax base), This simple
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11 Introduction
In this paper we study Brain Drain (BD hereafter) and Fiscal Competition (FC
hereafter) in a uniﬁed framework for the European Union (EU hereafter) speciﬁc
context. We propose a simple model in which is possible describe diﬀerent
scenarios: Brain Gain; Brain Drain (when there is unidirectional ﬂow of highly
skilled workers that is welfare-deteriorating in the source economy); Migration
Competition (when the regions have not high diﬀerences in the productivity
and they compete attracting educated workers); Fiscal Competition. These
scenarios change for diﬀerent values of the two key factors: the probability to
migrate, π, and the diﬀerence in the level of technology η.












Furthermore, this simple model help us to explain several policies imple-
mented by European regions.
Let us now deﬁne the two key words:
Fiscal Competition emerges because jurisdictions compete either to at-
tract a mobile tax base or to repel mobile beneﬁciaries of taxation. By "voting
with their feet" citizens choose their residence in a community which provides
them with their personally optimal combination of ﬁscal burden and public
goods. This migration process compels their communities to realize that they
are in a competitive framework.
FC may be horizontal, when it involves governments at the same level (i.e.
competition between regions or states in a federal country, or competition be-
tween countries within the EU ); and vertical, when higher and lower levels of
government are competitors (i. e. the "federal" level). In all cases, one cannot
presume whether ﬁscal competition is welfare enhancing or harmful1.
1In the FC literature the basic point [based on the model of Charles Tiebout’s (1956) ] is
2Brain Drain is an expression of British origin commonly used to describe
one of the most sensitive areas in the transfer of technology. It refers to skilled
professionals who leave their native lands in order to seek more promising op-
portunities elsewhere.
In the OECD Report (1987) there are other BD’s deﬁnitions: “Brain ex-
change implies a two-way ﬂow of expertise between a sending country and a
receiving country. Yet, where the net ﬂow is heavily biased in one direction,
the terms "brain gain" or "brain drain" is used. A further term, "brain waste",
describes the waste of skills that occurs when highly skilled workers migrate into
forms of employment not requiring the application of the skills and experience
applied in the former job”2.
In the EU context, mobility of European citizens is free of institutional con-
straints so that cultural integration increases the probability to migrate inside
the Union. For this reason, workers ﬂows acquired a relevant position in the EU
research agenda. The study of the BD is linked with the choice of education for
both workers and/or by governments. If education is a public good, educated
workers are free to migrate, as a side eﬀect FC can arise. If governments do
not coordinate taxation and provision of public goods, then the economy may
suﬀer strong negative externalities. In fact, if the growth of the economies is
associated with educated workers, we may record lower taxation, worse income
redistribution, and lower provision of public goods. Furthermore, the system
may record lower growth.
Although BD and FC are connected through agents mobility, the literature
studied them separately due to the complexity of a joint analysis. In partic-
ular, previous studies developed two separate branches for BD and FC. The
ﬁrst one focuses on BD in a macroeconomic setup and studies its impact on
the growth of diﬀerent economies. The second one analyses FC using micro-
economics tools and focuses on competitive interactions between workers and
Jurisdictions. Several studies are focused on externalities stemming out from
human capital migration but they are not adequate to simulate the new Eu-
ropean framework. In fact, in the past this BD was an unidirectional ﬂow of
highly skilled labor from LDCs. More recently, increased integration in the la-
bor markets, especially within the EU, has drawn attention to problems that
arise from bi-directional movement of skilled labor between similarly developed
countries. Thus, it is necessary to deﬁne a new BD typology speciﬁc to the
European context where the FC can be used as a “new policy tool” by the re-
gions. Furthermore, when we analyze the enlarged EU then we can distinguish
two diﬀerent “clubs” of regions, the former, with higher growth, and the new
those who move face, not only diﬀerent taxes rates but diﬀerent patterns and types of public
services, as well. Perhaps even more relevant to the study of migration of the well- educated
and well-oﬀ countries diﬀer, not only in their average taxes rates and in the size and eﬃciency
of their public services and transfer payments, but also in the distribution of costs and beneﬁts
among diﬀerent groups of taxpayers and beneﬁciaries.
2See Giannoccolo (2004) for a complete survey of the BD.
3entrants with lower growth and labour productivity. In this new context a new
speciﬁcation of BD and FC can arise. The former regions can compete to attract
the educated workers of the new regions. There exist numerously examples of
the FC and the “migration competition” in EU3.
For example, a recent Swedish policy reduces for three years the tax burden
for high level researchers going to Sweden. Similar initiatives are being imple-
mented in Denmark. Furthermore, scrutiny of the work permit system of most
European states indicates clearly that professional, managerial and technical
constitute the bulk of those accepted: Germany has introduced a “Green Card”
system to attract 20,000 IT workers to ﬁll shortages, although there are still
diﬃculties in ﬁnding enough potential migrants with the necessary skills. The
UK government has also adopted a more positive attitude towards skilled labor
migration, making changes to the work permit system which are designed to
increase the inﬂow of a range of skilled occupations, including IT and medical
personnel4. Finally, much of the discussion of the migration of highly skilled has
focused on the potential BD from east to west. Statistics5 show a migration of
scientists from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Western Europe.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deﬁnes assumptions and struc-
ture of the model. Section 3 solves the model in an “autarchic context” where
there is no migration. Section 4 describes the “mobility case” where there is
migration of educated worker among regions. Section 5 concludes with recom-
mendations for further extensions in the future.
3See Giannoccolo (2005) for a complete survey of these BD policies in Europe.
4See Salt (2001); Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) Salt, Compton, Densham, Hogarth, and
Schmidt, (1999); Dauderstädt (2001); Straubhaar (2000).
5See, for example, Wolburg (1996, 1997) and Wolburg & Wolter (1997).
42 The model
The model in this section is a simple version of the model of the BD and hu-
man capital formation by Mountford (1997). Diﬀerently from standard results,
the Mountford’s model ﬁnds some conditions in which BD generates positive
externalities for the regions where some educated workers migrate. We extend
Mountford’s model in diﬀerent directions. First, we introduce a government’s
role in the educational decisions of agents though the introduction of educational
subsidies and taxation. Second, we study the speciﬁc case in which the mobility
of workers is freely allowed (i. e. inside the European Union). These extensions
opens the way for a better identiﬁcation of the negative eﬀect generated by the
mutual interaction of FC and BD.
The model analyses an open economy, with only one good produced under
constant returns to scale by one factor: eﬃciency units of labor (Lt): Yt =
λtLt. There are a continuum of agents within each generation6. The education
decision is assumed to be a discrete choice: agents can choose either to be
educated or not be educated.
Let us assume that the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor is independent
of labor supply in time t (and thus of migration levels) and is dependent of the
productivity of the labor, or the level of technology λt, that is given: wt = λtw.
The distribution of ability Individuals possess diﬀerent levels of latent
ability, where ei denotes the latent ability level of individual i. These latent
abilities are assumed to be distributed over the closed interval [0,E] according
to the density function g
￿
ei￿






dei = 1 and g
￿
ei￿
> 0 ∀ei ∈ [0,E].
Let us assume that all generations have latent abilities which are picked up from
the same distribution and that the abilities of children are independent from the
abilities of their parents.
The growth externality Let us assume that there is an economy wide
growth externality related to the proportion of educated workers in the economy
in the previous period st−1. Thus we model λt to be a positive function of the
proportion of educated workers in the previous period, that is







dei and where λ
￿ (st−1) > 0. (1)
Let’s also assume that λ(0) = 1 and that λ(1) is ﬁnite.
6For simplicity we normalize the population in each generation to unity. Population growth
is excluded.
5Education All agents have the same preferences and access to the same
technology, although they do not have the same levels of latent ability.
Agents that invest7 in education obtain ei eﬃciency units of labor, where ei
is the level of the latent ability of agent i. Furthermore let us assume that the
agents who do not invest in education have only one eﬃciency unit of labor and
that the cost of education to be ﬁxed at c units of output.
The government inﬂuences the education decision of the agents by taxing
the educated workers8 and covering part of their education costs9. In presence
of government subsidies the cost of education becomes c − γt , where γt is the
education subsidy deﬁned as the unit of output reimbursed to educated agents
in generation t and γt ∈ [0,c].
Let us deﬁne Tt to be the marginal rate of taxation of educated workers in
generation t. Introducing taxation, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor
becomes wi
t = λtwei [1 − Tt].
Migration Let us assume that emigration is only permitted for educated
agents10. We assume that the probability of successful emigration for educated
agents born in region J, πJ, is independent of the number of workers who are
eligible to emigrate. Let us assume that emigration policy are fully anticipated.
7We assume that agents have the resources to invest in education. In Mountford (1997),
the agents have not resources of their own, so they must borrow from the capital market at
the world’s rate of interest, r∗. The author also introduces an overlapping generations world
where the agents live for three periods.
8We assume that only the educated workers are taxed. Then we focus our analysis on the
taxation reserved to pay the education’s subsidies. In this analysis we do not take in account
redistribution policies of the governments. Even if a partial redistribution of income derives
from the progressive taxation uses to ﬁnance the educational costs. If we take in account the
redistribution policies we accentuate the negative eﬀects of the FC. According to the literature
we will obtain less redistribution and less provision of public good with respect to the eﬃcient
value (which could be obtained in the absence of mobility or in the presence of coordination
among jurisdictions). In Giannoccolo (2003) we analyzed the negative externalities due to FC
and to educated migration and we have analyzed their eﬀect on the redistribution policies and
on the supply of education as public good.
9These subsidies are given directly to educated. The analysis does not change if we con-
sider an equivalent average education investment of the government (academic and research
infrastructures, school places, teachers, etc.).
10This hypothesis is compatible with the assumption that there are not mobility costs. The
results do not change if we assume that the costs of mobility (transfers’ costs, social costs,
integration’s costs, etc...) are very small for educated workers (closed to zero) and very high
for non educated. It is furthermore possible extend the analysis to the case in which there
are not educational requirement for emigration but becomes hard distinguish the BD aspects
of the workers migration. Among those who do migrate whether domestically or abroad, the
highly educated are over-represented, partly because they are more likely to posses skills that
are in demand, but also because they are more likely to have contacts in and knowledge about
possible places to move. To extent that migration of the highly skilled may to be triggered
by diﬀerent factors, survey data reported by Grubel and Scott (1966, 1976) suggests that job
opportunities and challenges are even more important to the highly educated. It is also true
that for many such workers, particularly in health care, education, and government-supported
fundamental research, the 1990s have seen large cuts in government spending induced by
budget pressures. For example the pre tax and post tax distributions of the income have
become more unequal in the US relative to Canada. All of these factors may have increased
the net attraction of migration for the better-educated. [Helliwell 1999]
6The individual’s decision to be educated In each period t we assume
that sJ






w ≡ aJ. (2)
In this model we assume that there is not mobility costs so educated workers
decide whether migrate or not in response to diﬀerent net wage that they receive.
Their future wage is related to the taxation/subsidies policies of the governments
and to the diﬀerences of technology between regions. It is straightforward to
verify that the educated workers will prefer to stay in region J if





and where the region I is the region that provides to educated agents the
higher wage (net of taxation) that is possible obtain in the region where the
agents can migrate.
We can therefore distinguish three diﬀerent states of the world:
Case (1) TJ
t < η + (1 − η)TI
t all educated want migrate in region J.
Case (2) TJ
t > η + (1 − η)TI
t all educated want migrate in region I.
Case (3) TJ
t = η + (1 − η)TI
t there is no migration.
If TJ,t ≤ η + (1 − η)TI,t (case 1 and case 3), then the optimal decision for
agent i , born in region J, will be to invest in education if
aJ (1 − TJ,t)ei > aJ + c − γJ. (4)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗ will invest in education,
were e∗ is uniquely deﬁned by the following equality:
e∗
J,t =
aJ + c − γJ
(1 − TJ,t)aJ
. (5)
If TJ,t > η+(1 − η)TI,t (case 2), then the optimal decision for agent i, born
in region J, will be to invest in education if
[(1 − πJ)(1 − TJ,t)aJ + πJ (1 − TI,t)aI]ei = aJ + c − γJ. (6)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗ will invest in education,
were e∗ is uniquely deﬁned by the following equality:
e∗
J,t =
aJ + c − γJ
(1 − πJ)(1 − TJ,t)aJ + πJ (1 − TI,t)aI
. (7)
7The government. Let us deﬁne ΩJ
t a measure of the welfare of the region
J derived from the productivity of the agents that in time t are resident in
region J11.

























where sJ,t is the number of agents which are educated in region J at time t
and work in region J at t+1; sIJ,t is the number of agents which are educated in
region I at time t and work in region J at time t+1. The ﬁrst term on the right
hand side of (8) denotes the total production (net of education’s costs) of region
J due to the presence of educated workers. The second term corresponds to
the total productivity of region J independently from the presence of educated
workers.
For each time t the government J maximizes the Ω1
J,t subject to a balance
constraint for each generation t. Furthermore, let us assume that the govern-
ment decides independently by the positive externality of education of genera-
tion t for the future generations and that the balance constraint is binding.
So we have,
γJ (sJ,t) = (sJ,t)A1
J,tTJ,t (10)















The balance constraint is
γI (sI,t) = (sI,t)A1
I,tTI,t. (13)
If TJ,t > η + (1 − η)TI,t (case 2), we have the symmetric case.
In the next sections we analyze diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model: Autarchic
case and Mobility case.
11This is a non-standard function of social welfare. It is a measure of the region’s gain
derived from the productivity of each generation, net of the educational costs. It allows to
compare the diﬀerent scenarios analyzed in this model and to capture the educational decisions
of the government. In the next chapter the ﬁgure (2) gives a graphic intuition of ΩJ
t . It is
possible extend this static simpliﬁcation of the model by deﬁning a social welfare function
that take in account the externalities linked to the education.
83 Autarchic Case (π = 0) and Role of the Gov-
ernment
In this section we solve the model in an “autarchic context” where there is not
migration between regions. Let us resume the timing of the model.
1st Step The government decides Tt and γt and inﬂuences the private cost of educa-
tion. Each agent i decides whether to invest in education or not according
to their latent ability ei. Agents who invest in education receive γt and
pay c − γt.
2nd Step The educated agents pay Tt to their government and repay the debt.
It is possible to solve the government maximization problem through the
Backward Induction method (BI hereafter)12. First we solve the maximization
problem of the agents and then we solve the maximization problem of govern-
ment. The agent’s decision is given by equation (5)
e∗A
J,t =
aJ + c − γJ
(1 − TJ,t)aJ
. (14)
Let us analyze the government’s decision. When there is not migration
















For each time t the government J maximizes the ΩA
J,t subject to a balance
constraint for each generation t. Furthermore, let us assume that the balance
constraint is binding.
So we have
γJ (sJ,t) = (sJ,t)AA
J,tTJ,t. (17)





The optimal value of the taxation T∗J
t (and indirectly, by the equation 17,
the optimal value of the subsidies to educated) is
T∗A






12See the Appendix for all the computation of this autarchic case.
9where
0 < T∗A





We can resume this ﬁrst result with the following proposition.








exists a positive optimal level of taxation and, consequently, a positive level of
educational subsidies. This optimal level is T∗A






3.1 Role of government and eﬀects on the region’s growth
To understand better the role of the government on the educational decisions of
the agents, we have to compare how the welfare changes in presence of positive
subsidies to education. In ﬁgure (2) we show graphically these changes.
0 ae
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Figure 2: Autarchic case. Role of the educational subsidies on the welfare and on the number
of educated workers.






















then the number of educated workers in presence of government subsidies is
higher than in absence of subsidies. When the educational costs increase, then
the conditions to have a positive role of government, decrease.
In ﬁgure (3) are shown the eﬀects of taxation on the individual income of the
agents. In presence of subsidies we have a redistributive role of the government
that increases the educational costs to agents with greater latent ability and
decreases the costs to agents with lower ability.





Figure 3: Eﬀects of taxation on the individual income of the agents
Dynamics and steady state productivity The only dynamics in the
model derive from the growth externality. From equation (1) it is clear that the
proportion of workers who are educated at time t is an increasing function of
the proportion of workers who were educated at time t − 1, that is









































Let us assume that E is high enough so that the most able worker will always
chooses to be educated even if no one was educated in the previous period. Since
we know that agent i with ei = 0 will never chooses to be educated, then this
implies that there must exist at least one steady state equilibrium for st, which
we denote as ¯ s. Whether this is a unique steady state depends on the properties
of the function λt = λ(st−1). If this function has convex regions, representing
“critical masses” of educated people in the economy, then there may be multiple













                                                                                         
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        
                                                                                        







Figure 4: Ψ∗ (st) indicates the proportion of educated agents in autarkic case, when there
is not migration and there are government’s subsidies. Ψ0 (st) indicates the proportion of
educated agents in autarkic case,when there is not migration and there are not government’s
subsidies to educated.
We can resume these results with the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The number of educated workers increases respect the case with
zero educational subsidies if and only if E
2 < e∗A
J,t < E − 1 − c
aJ .
Corollary 1 The increase in the number of educated identiﬁes a redistributive
role of the government that decreases the educational costs for the worker
with lower latent abilities. The higher the educational costs, the lower
conditions to have a positive role of government.
Corollary 2 The increase in the number of educated workers implies an in-
crease in the welfare and in the growth of the economy respect the case
with zero educational subsidies.
12These results are an improvement of the case analyzed by Mounford. The
introduction of subsidies and taxes implies, given the conditions in propositions
1 and 2, an increase in the number of educated workers and, consequently, an
higher growth.
4 Mobility Case (0 < π < 1)
Let us introduce in the model educated workers mobility. The timing of the
model is the same of the Autarchic case. The only diﬀerence is that, in the
second step, educated agents decide whether to migrate or not. They pay Tt
to the government of the region in which they work. It is possible to solve the
government maximization problem through the BI method13.
As in the previous sections we distinguish three diﬀerent states of the world:
Case 1: TJ,t < η + (1 − η)TI,t , all educated want migrate in region J.
First, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗ will invest in education,




Second, the government of region J maximizes Ω1
J,t given by equation (8).
Thus, the optimal value of the taxation T∗1
J,t (and indirectly, by the equation
(10), the optimal value of the subsidies to educated) is
T∗1


















The government of region J maximizes Ω1
I,t given by equation (11). Thus,
the optimal value of the taxation T∗1
I,t (and indirectly, by the equation 13, the
optimal value of the subsidies to educated) is
T∗1























Case 2 : TJ,t > η +(1 − η)TI,t , all educated want migrate in region I. We
have the symmetric case.
Case 3 : TJ,t = η+(1 − η)TI,t, there is no migration and the optimal value
of the taxation is the same that we will demonstrate in the next section (full
mobility case).
13See the Appendix for all the computation.
134.1 Full mobility case (π = 1)
Let us examine the case in which π = 1, all educated workers are eligible to mi-
grate. We solve the government maximization problem through the BI method.
The optimal decision for agent i, born in region J, is to invest in education
if
argmax{[1 − TJ,t]aJ;[1 − TI,t]aI}ei> aJ+c − γJ (29)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗
J,t invest in education, were




argmax{[1 − TJ,t]aJ;[1 − TI,t]aI}
. (30)
Also in this case we can distinguish three diﬀerent states of the world.
Given the risk to loose all the educated workers, each government decides
the level of T that is compatible to stay in case three. Otherwise the region not
only looses all his educated workers but also subsidizes the education of workers
that, migrating, will not refund these investment by paying taxes.
In case three, TJ,t = η + (1 − η)TI,t, there is no migration and the optimal
value of the taxation is diﬀerent if aJ ￿ aI. Let us analyse these sub-cases.





J,t − c − aJ
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+ aJ and Ω1


















and the balance constraints are
γJ (sJ,t) = (sJ,t)A1
J,t and γI = 0 (33)
Thus, the optimal values of the taxation (and indirectly, by the balance
constraints, the optimal values of the subsidies to educated) are
T∗1
J,t = η∗and T∗1
I,t = 0. (34)
Where η∗ = η − ε, and lim ε → 0.
• If aJ < aI, then we have the symmetric case:
TJ,t = 0 and TI,t =
aI − aJ
aI
− ε, where lim ε → 0 (35)
14• If aJ = aI, then the solution is
TJ,t = 0 and TI,t = 0 (36)
The region that have higher level of technology (so higher number of edu-
cated workers in the previous period) decides the higher level of taxation suﬃ-
cient to attract the educated workers of the other region. In this case the other
regions settle zero taxes (and, consequently, zero subsidies). When the countries
have the same level of technology, then there are no tax and no subsidies in all
regions.
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Figure 5:
The following proposition summarizes the results obtained in this section.
Proposition 3 In presence of full mobility of educated agents, the only NE
is zero taxation (and, consequently, zero subsidies) when the regions have the
same initial technology (aJ = aI). When the countries are asymmetric (aJ >
aI ⇒ η > 0), then the only NE is
￿
T∗1
J,t = η∗, T∗1
I,t = 0
￿
. Where η∗ is the higher
level of taxation suﬃcient to attract all the educated workers of the other region
[η∗ = η − ε, and lim ε → 0].
154.2 Brain Drain or Brain Gain?
To understand better the role of the migration on the regions’ growth let us
analyze if there are circumstances in which the presence of migration increase
the number of educated workers in both the regions and so increases the growth
of these countries.
Mountford (1997) shows that when migration is not a certainty, a BD may
increase average productivity and equality in the source economy even though
average productivity is a positive function of the past average levels of human
capital in an economy. Similar results are in Stark and Wang (2002), Stark et
al. (1997) and Stark (2004). Following Mountford, we deﬁne the circumstances
in which there is Brain Gain and there is taxation and subsidies to education.
Let us analyze the case (1): TJ,t < η+(1 − η)TI,t , all educated want migrate
in region J.
The region J does not lose his educated workers and attracts educated ones
of the other regions. So, to analyze the possibility of "gain" from the migration
(Brain Gain) we study the sending countries.















If π = 1 then the source economy loses all his educated workers and sN
t = 0.
If π = 0 then there is not migration inside the union. Thus, a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of a positive level of BD such that the source economy beneﬁts
in terms of productivity is that
dsI,t
dπ > 0 when π = 0. The optimal level of π
will be given where
dsI,t


























































{aI + c − γJ}[(1 − TJ,t)aJ − (1 − TI,t)aI]
[(1 − πI)(1 − TI,t)aI + πI (1 − TJ,t)aJ]
2 < 0. (41)

















a quarter, we obtain the results summarized by the following proposition.
16Proposition 4 If there are strong diﬀerences on the wage per eﬃciency unit
of labor and there are imperfect mobility of educated workers, then a positive







4 and 0 < TI,t ≤ T∗A
I,t .
This proposition states that the source economy can beneﬁt from the BD
if there are a suﬃcient number of people who would be entitled to invest in
education. The introduction of taxes and subsidies implies two diﬀerent results.
Diﬀerently the Mountford’s model, the subsidies increase the number of edu-
cated workers and so decrease the probability for the new entry to be in the
“optimal BD conditions”. Furthermore, the taxes increase the wage diﬀerentials
between the entry region and the others and so increase the probability to gain
from the BD.






















> 0 iﬀ (1 − πI)
(1 − TJ,t)aJ − (1 − TI,t)aI










Thus, a BD will increase the proportion of educated people in the econ-
omy if πI is low, if (1 − TJ,t)aJ is very high relative to (1 − TI,t)aI and if the
proportion of educated people in the economy was previously low.
Equation (44) implies that when abilities are distributed uniformly, and if
(1 − TJ,t)aJ is large enough, then there is a positive level of πI such that next
period productivity increases in the source economy.
As in Mountford (1997), in presence of an optimal migration policy under a
BD, the return function st = ψ(st−1) is everywhere above the return function
compared with the case of no emigration. Thus clearly an optimal emigration
policy will increase the short and long run productivity in the source economy.
Finally, if there are multiple steady state equilibria then a temporary emigration
policy might lift a source economy from a low to a high education steady state.
The ﬁgure (6) depicts these results
17 
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Figure 6: depicts the dynamics of the economy when there is a unique steady state equilib-
rium for the case where there is not migration and when there is optimal emigration (Ψ0 is
the case with optimal taxation and Ψm is the case without taxation).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study Brain Drain and Fiscal Competition in a uniﬁed frame-
work for the EU speciﬁc context.
We deﬁne a simple version of the model of Mountford (1997) that we improve
by introducing a direct role of the government in the education decisions. More
precisely, the presence of subsidies to education costs and of taxation to educated
workers inﬂuences the individual education decision of the agents. Propositions
(1) and (2) show the conditions that imply a positive role of the government in
the education decisions.
Section 5 describes the mobility case where there is migration of educated
workers. Diﬀerent scenarios are possible when we introduce migration. These
scenarios ( ﬁgure 1) change for diﬀerent values of the two key factors: the
probability to migrate, π, and the diﬀerence in the level of technology η.
Brain Gain When region J is more productive than region I and the probabil-
ity to migrate π is low, then we are in the scenario described by Mountford
(1997). BD may increase average productivity and equality in the source
economy (Brain Gain). In the European context this scenario can be pos-
sible when new entrant in EU is less productive than the former ones. In
this scenario the optimal policies of the EU institutions is no action.
Brain Drain The diﬀerences among regions are so high that the region with
highest productivity can attract educated workers from the others regions
without change the optimal package of services and tax rates. This sce-
nario is normally studied by BD literature that often refers to the uni-
directional ﬂow of highly skilled labor from Lower Developed Countries
18(LDCs). This literature has explained the lower provision of human cap-
ital as a “negative ﬁscal externalities” due to migration14. The possi-
bility that the welfare of those remaining in the LDCs could be reduced
by an outﬂow of educated manpower had been recognized in the litera-
ture as well. From the work of Grubel and Scott, Berry and Soligo, and
Harry Johnson in the 1960s, the main conclusion was that welfare of non-
migrants would fall only if the migrants’ contribution to national output
were greater than their income (or consumption in a static model). For
a number of reasons the literature believes that the conditions for a BD
to be welfare-deteriorating are often veriﬁed. Furthermore there are dif-
ferent studies about the BD15 and considerable attention has been given
to a proposal of Bhagwati’s for a “brain drain tax” which would reduce
the incentives for such a migration to take place16. In this scenario the
optimal policies of the EU institutions is to introduce a“brain drain tax”
to compensate the new entrant.
Migration Competition In this case, the regions have not high diﬀerences in
the productivity and they compete attracting educated workers (migration
competitions). There are several “Brain Drain Competition” policies im-
plemented in Europe. In Giannoccolo (2005) there is an exhaustive survey
of these policies. Furthermore, the tables in appendix give us an overview
of mechanisms to attract foreign research graduates in Europe. The key
strategies and mechanisms found are: making the academic system more
open and ﬂexible; improving the regulatory conditions particularly on im-
migration; better sign-posting and information at national level; dedicated
grants for foreign researchers; adapting income situations to market forces;
providing tax reductions speciﬁcally for researchers and knowledge work-
ers; more active international marketing and support for international
researchers. It is possible divide these policies in seven macro—groups: im-
migration policies, incentives to the researchers and their family, grants
and scholarships, tax and salaries, investment in Research, marketing and
recruiting policies, studies and analysis of the immigration policies of the
others countries.
14Berry and Soligo (1969), for example, show that, as far as the production of human capital
(i.e. schooling and professional or academic education) is subsidized, the emigration country
loses human capital when people with human capital leave their origin. Consequently (and
according to the theory of public goods) the production of human capital in the emigration
countries is too low in comparison to a world without migration. Bhagwati (1976a) shows the
existence of a negative ﬁscal externality on the emigration country, if education is publicly
subsidized. If the economy wide education is expanded in response to emigration the govern-
mental deﬁcit increases ceteris paribus. Furthermore educational subsidies can be regarded
as an investment of the old generation into their pension which is lost in case of permanent
emigration (Grubel & Scott, 1977).
15See Bhagwati and Hamada (1974); Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975a; 1975b); McCulloch
and Yellen (1975); Blomqvis (1986); Bodenhofer (1967); Sjaastad (1962); Rodriguez (1975);
Romans (1974); Edding and Bodenhofer (1966); Johnson (1965); Kesselman (2000).
16Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973), Bhagwati (1975,1976a, 1976b) and Hamada (1977).
19Fiscal Competition The probability to migrate is high (or closed to one) and
the countries have the same productivity (or very closed). Then there is
"potential Brain Drain" and Fiscal Competition. The possibility to loose
all the educated workers implies that the countries reduce the investment
in education (race to bottom). In the European context this scenario is
possible among the former regions of EU. In this scenario the optimal
policies of the EU institutions is to coordinate all the regions and deﬁne a
target in the investment in education and research. This coordination is
the target of the "Lisbon Strategy". For example, the subsequent Spring
European Councils (Lisbon 2000, Stockholm 2001, Barcelona 2002 and
Brussels in 2003) have endorsed the ERA (European Research Area) and
set a series of objectives inviting the Commission and the Member States
to take due account of the possible shortage of human resources in R&D
as well as of the importance of enhancing the training and mobility of
researchers. Breimer of LERU [League of European Research Universities],
says: “At Lisbon in 2000, the EU set its own challenge: to compete.
What this means is that Brain Drain should work in both directions –
we should make ourselves attractive to the U.S., too. If Europe follows
the lead of its most innovative institutions, it can do just that, and it will
have a ready audience: Europeans who have moved abroad would love
to come home”. Claiming that the “Brain Drain should work in both
directions”, the European Commission suggests, from one side, to invest
more in research (3% of GDP) and, from the other side, to implement
policies and strategies to reverse the Brain Drain and “make the Europe
attractive to the researchers from the rest of the world”.
Extensions of the model
The model presented in this paper can be extended in order to analyze
diﬀerent economic and political analyses.
1. We can introduce a “mobility cost” for the educated workers. This cost
can be not only referred to the pecuniary costs directly linked to the mi-
gration (transport, new house, etc.) but also it can be referred to the “non
pecuniary cost” indirectly linked to the migration (live in a new nation,
diﬀerent language, etc.). The introduction of this costs do not change the
main results obtained in this paper but there are some important results:
• The more are the “mobility cost”, the lower is the role of FC.
• While the “pecuniary cost” are normally similar between the diﬀer-
ent regions, on the contrary the “non pecuniary costs” can be very
diﬀerent and they can be directly inﬂuenced by the policies of the
government. These diﬀerences may increase or decrease eventually
technology’s diﬀerences and so the FC and BD externalities. Fur-
thermore, by decreasing these costs, the government of the former
region inside the EU can try to attract the educated workers of the
new entry (migration competition).
202. We can introduce a “enlarged role of the government”. In this paper we
have analyzed a government which do not take in account redistribution
income policies. If we consider a new version of the social welfare function
that the government want maximize then we have other important results:
• The FC implies not only lower provision of public good but also lower
income redistribution. This results, in according to the FC literature,
is due to the fact that each government decreases the tax in order
to attract the educated worker and so it must decrease the income
redistribution.
• If we analyze the redistribution policies, then we must take in account
also the “non educated” migrations. The risk to attract many non
educated workers implies lower income redistribution and so increase
the negative externalities of the FC.
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sub to γJ (sJ,t) = (sJ,t)AA
J,tTJ,t.





























and by the optimal value of e∗A

































Where 0 < T∗A
J,t < 1 if e∗A
J,t > E
2 .
Mobility Case Let us solve the Mobility Case by the BI method.
Case 1: TJ,t < η + (1 − η)TI,t , all educated want migrate in region J.
First, let us analyse the region J. All agents with a latent ability greater





Second, the government of region J maximizes Ω1
J,t given by equation (8).
Thus, the optimal value of the taxation T∗1
J,t (and indirectly, by the equation
(10).













































22and by the optimal value of e∗








































Second, let us analyse the region I. All agents with a latent ability greater




aJ + c − γI
(1 − πI)(1 − TI,t)aI + πJ (1 − TJ,t)aJ
(45)
.
Second, the government of region I maximizes Ω1
I,t given by equation (11).
Thus, the optimal value of the taxation T∗1
I,t (and indirectly, by the equation
(13).














































and by the optimal value of e∗
I,t equation the FOC becomes
[(1 − πI)(1 − TI,t)aI + πJ (1 − TJ,t)aJ]e∗
I,t + γI = 0
or
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267 Tables
Overview of mechanisms to attract foreign research graduates in Eu-
rope
MECHANISM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRY 
 
Particular  scientific  visa  procedure  for  third  country 
researchers and a work permit is automatically issued for 
spouses 
France, Germany 
Increase  the  speed  of  processing  visa  applications  for 
student and researchers  Denmark, UK 
Flexible administrative arrangements for researchers   Finland 
Special measures to facilitate the entry of skilled 
workers in current demand 
Denmark introduced fast tracking of IT skilled persons as 
part of ‘job-card’ . 
German ‘IT-specialists Temporary Relief Programme’ – 
“green “ cards 
A 5-year programme to attract IT and biotech persons to 
Ireland 
The  UK  permit  system  has  responded  successfully  to 
bring in health and medical services workers 
The Netherlands  and Belgium continue  with restrictive 
employment  policy,  although  there  are  special 
considerations  for  highly  skilled  workers  that  are  in 





Provision of a continuos visa in place of having to renew 
permits every years  UK 
Allowing applications for researchers to be made in the 
French Embassy in their home country (eliminating the 
need to go through the International Immigration office) 





Providing  the  researcher  with  an  agent  (who  will 
moderate  administrative  procedures  once  the  Embassy 




27MECHANISM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRY 
 
All researchers’ children have the right by law to day-
care  Finland, Sweden 
Replacement  costs  for  researchers  on  sabbaticals  are 
covered  Belgium 
Some countries provide easier access to fast-track 
language courses 
Greece provides language courses to the family 
In  Germany,  the  Alexander  von  Humboldt  Foundation 
and  the  German  Academic  Exchange  Service  provide 
support  for  language  courses  before  the  start  of  the 
fellowships they finance 
In  Luxembourg  and  Finland,  special  language  and 
cultural support is offered to accompanying children both 




The  researcher’s  family  is  taken  into  account  when 
granting funding for stays abroad  Finland 
A work permit is automatically issued for spouses of the 
researchers   France, Germany 
Foreign  researchers  can  benefit  from  reduced  fees, 
subsidised  accommodation  and  guesthouses  mostly  for 
short stays. 
Finland 
The Kastler Foundation provides personalised assistance 
to researchers from abroad.  France 
Free  accommodation  and  travel  payment  for  visiting 
professors for up to 1 year  Finland 
Incentives to the 
researchers and 
their family 
In the new Greek programme for temporary employment 




the UK spends £ 62 million on foreign students compared 
to  £254  million  on  home  students,  which  is  a  ratio  of 
nearly 1:4. 
UK 
There are prolific numbers of transnational mobility 
schemes 
Portugal  has  increased  the  number  of  mobility 
fellowships  for  incoming  foreign  researchers  by  50% 
from 1994 to 1999 
Finland  has  bilateral  research  exchange  schemes  with 
many of the candidate countries 
Almost 50% of  Luxembourg’s  national research  grants 
are allocated to non-nationals 
Scholarships to foreign scientists who establish research 
groups  in  Germany 
Germany, Portugal 
Luxembourg, Finland 
The  Kosmos Award, a prize  of DM 750,000  is given to 
establish a group of young researchers in Germany  Germany 
For short term study visits for research students  Finland , Netherlands 
Grants and 
scholarships 
Research Grants / Fellowship   UK, France, 
Denmark, UK  
 
Figure 8:
28MECHANISM  DESCRIPTION  COUNTRY 
 
The  UK  governments  plans  to  increase  the  salaries  of 
post-doctorates by 25% and increase funding for hiring 
of university professors. 
UK 
Austria is moving towards a system where researchers in 
the  public  sector  are  no  longer  civil  servants  and  are 
therefore  not  part  of  the  specific  civil  service  pension 
system. 
Austria 
Providing tax reductions specifically for researchers 
and knowledge workers 
Outstanding researcher tax reduction for up 3 years from 
40% to 25% (Denmark, Sweden) 
Speciality workers compensated with a rebate of 30% of 
total earned during stay (Netherlands) 
Denmark, Sweden, 
Netherlands, France 
Tax and salaries 
Attempts  to  retain  teachers  educated in country by 




The 2004 government budget includes new tax relief for 
companies that invest in R & D.  Ireland 
Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) will plow €400 million 
into research over the next three years  Ireland 
The Volkswagen Foundation will fund the establishment 
of ten to twelve Lichtenberg professorships per year. The 
new initiative will enable higher education institutes in 
Germany  to  attract  young  scientists  by  establishing 
professorships in innovative research 
Germany 
Some 7000 teaching researcher posts have been created 
since 1997 to retain talent and encourage the return of 




In  2000  the  British  government  and  the  Wolfson 
Foundation,  a  research  charity,  launched  a  five-year 
research award. The £20 million scheme aims to attract 
the return of Britain’s leading expatriate scientist and the 
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The Kastler Foundation provides personalised assistance 
to researchers from abroad.  France 
International data base for vacancies  Netherlands  
In  the  UK,  open  recruitment  is  common  practice  with 
some  schemes  supporting  the  costs  of  recruiting 
outstanding researchers from industry or overseas. 
UK 
Germany  Austria  and  France  are  actively  recruiting 
undergraduate  and  post-graduate  science  students  from 
Poland and other former eastern bloc countries. 
Germany and Austria offer incentives such as university 
courses in English and favourable funding schemes 
France, Austria, 
Germany 
The  Irish  Ministers  of    Enterprise    Trade  and  
Development  are  recruiting expatriates to return to build 
the software industry; targeting those returning home for 
Christmas - Irish Christmas recruitment 
Ireland 
The  Department  for  Education  and  Employment 
launched  the  UK  Education  Brand  which  marked  the 
beginning of a three-year programme to raise the profile 
overseas  of  UK  education.  The  Brand,  together  with 
generic  marketing  materials,  supports  promotion 
activities overseas  of UK higher education institutions. 
The budget put towards this initiative is 7.8 million EUR 
UK 
Unified body for international marketing  France, Finland 
Pursuing agreements with international associations  Denmark 




In  some  research  funding  organisations  in  Member 
States,  foreign  participation  in  recruitment  and/or 
evaluation  committees  is  compulsory  or  facilitated  by 




ESRC  (Economic &Social Research Council): “Science 
Brain Drain – How some European countries attract 
the top scientific talent” suggests how to compete with 
Austria, Germany and France that are actively recruiting 
undergraduate  and  post-graduate  science  students  from 
Poland and other former eastern bloc countries 
UK 
ESRC : “MOBEX project”, which examines the factors 
that  influence  scientists  to  make  international  career 
moves (with an analysis of the causes  why Italy attracts 
few international scientists) 
UK 
“Benchmarking Mechanisms and Strategies to attract 
Researchers to Ireland”. A study for the Expert Group 
on Future Skills Needs. How the Ireland will face even 
more competition in attracting research talent 
Ireland 
Studies and 
analysis of the 
immigration 
policies of the 
others countries 
“High Level Expert Group on Improving Mobility of 
Researchers -  Final Report” (4 April 2001) 
“Good practice examples” of the policies and strategies 
of the Member States to attract researchers 
EU 
 
Figure 10:
30